By: Sophia Mathewson / Edited by: Maximus Craig
From extreme wildfires to droughts, Boulder, Colorado—like a growing number of cities around the world—is facing increasingly costly climate disasters. These events not only cause direct environmental damage, but impose costs on local governments as they repair infrastructure and implement responses. Determining who to hold legally responsible in these cases, however, is complicated. In Suncor Energy Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, Boulder seeks to hold energy companies liable for their alleged role in contributing to climate change, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for this case on Oct. 5, but a decision has not been made yet, and the Supreme Court has allowed this case to move forward. The case’s outcome affects not only the multimillion-dollar suit in Colorado, but also similar lawsuits pending across the country. Generally, Boulder’s lawsuit reflects growing efforts to use state tort law to hold energy companies responsible for alleged climate-related harms. Due to the diffuse nature of emissions across state and international borders, however, state tort litigation becomes a weak legal approach for assigning liability for such harms. Because damages can function as de facto regulation, Suncor highlights the tension between states’ traditional authority to compensate local injuries and the need for consistent legal standards governing pollution crossing state and international borders.
While Colorado’s suit doesn’t directly contradict existing regulation surrounding climate change, state tort damages can become de facto regulation even when framed as compensation. In Suncor, Boulder’s argument for the merits of the suit is that the state is not changing or superseding regulation by simply seeking compensation for harms. However, Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette (1987) shows how the court has interpreted the regulatory impacts of litigation in these instances to serve as de facto regulation. International Paper (IPC) operated a pulp and paper mill in New York, discharging pollutants into Lake Champlain. Plaintiffs who lived on the Vermont side of the lake requested monetary damages and an injunction to stop the pollution, claiming the “smelly” pollutants created a nuisance under Vermont common law and decreased their property values. The Supreme Court found that, if respondents were entitled to the full amount of damages and injunctive relief sought in the complaint, IPC would be forced to change its methods of doing business to avoid the threat of liability. As Justice Powell explained for the Court, “The inevitable result of such suits would be that Vermont and other States could do indirectly what they could not do directly – regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources.” Similarly, in holding energy companies liable for damages, Boulder would effectively force energy companies to adjust their practices to avoid monetary liability.
Determining liability in climate change cases is especially difficult given that the conduct and causation are global, rather than bound by state borders. Several past cases support Suncor’s argument that local state tort laws cannot be used to regulate or penalize greenhouse-gas emissions. Specifically, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (1972) established that federal common law—rather than the laws within an individual state—must govern when dealing with pollution in its ambient or interstate aspects, due to the overriding federal interests involved. Suncor uses this precedent to argue that localized lawsuits cannot be used to dictate the transboundary issue of greenhouse gas emissions. American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (2011) applied the Milwaukee framework to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, establishing that federal common-law nuisance claims targeting greenhouse gas emissions are displaced by the Clean Air Act because Congress assigned regulation of those emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency. In simple terms, federal common-law nuisance claims cannot be used to regulate carbon emissions because the EPA has authority in this area.
However, traditional doctrine doesn’t clearly justify rejecting Boulder’s state-law claims. In the Yale Journal on Regulation, Rachel Rothschild points out important critiques for using Intl. Paper, Milwaukee, and American Electric in Suncor. Primarily, Rothschild challenges the idea that state and federal common law are mutually exclusive. For example, Milwaukee found federal common law available in the dispute between state and city governments over interstate pollution, but it did not determine whether state tort law is available in similar claims; she states the case does not support the “sweeping” argument that only federal common law claims are permitted in cases of pollution. Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley Law School, notes Suncor does not fit neatly within the established categories of preemption, the legal rule that valid federal law takes precedence over conflicting state law. Article VI of the Constitution states that federal law invalidates state law if there is a conflict between the two, and Boulder’s suit does not directly conflict with the Clean Air Act— the conflict preemption is therefore not valid here.
Still, even if Boulder has the stronger argument under preemption doctrine, practical difficulties remain in using tort law to assign liability for harms caused by diffuse interstate and international emissions. The ambiguity surrounding this case is not simply whether state and federal common law can coexist, but whether Boulder can ask that its state tort law assign consequences to activities occurring across jurisdictions. If similar claims in other states proceed, energy companies could face varying rules for the same global conduct due to contrasting states’ common law. Beyond establishing federal dominion over interstate pollution claims, Ouellette recognizes the regulatory problems that can arise with these differences in legal standards.
Suncor exposes the difficulty of using individual states’ tort laws to assign liability for climate change, a harm arising from diffuse interstate and international emissions. The significant problems of causation, geographic authority, and inconsistent legal standards weaken attempts to hold polluters accountable through compensatory suits. The Court’s decision on this issue will need to consider the extent of states’ traditional authority to remedy local harms in the context of global conduct.