Judicial Overreach and The Scope of Injunctive Relief in Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc.

By: James Tsamaidis / Edited by: Aryella Botier

Apple’s App Store lets developers distribute apps to millions of Apple device users. Previously, Apple charged commissions of 15% to 30% on certain digital purchases made through its in-app payment system. Alongside these commissions, Apple also imposed anti-steering provisions preventing developers from directing customers to cheaper alternative payment options outside the App Store, known as “external link-out payments.” In 2020, Epic Games sued Apple in Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., claiming Apple engaged in anticompetitive practices by preventing consumers from finding alternatives that are both more profitable for the developer and cheaper for the consumer. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed that Apple’s anti-steering provisions were anticompetitive under California’s Unfair Competition Law and issued an injunction, a court order requiring a party to take or stop a particular action, barring Apple from blocking link-out purchases. The injunction did not explicitly ban the commission fees, allowing Apple to subsequently impose a 27% commission on all external link-out purchases, making any non-App Store sales economically unviable for developers. Epic argued that Apple violated the intention of the injunction, despite its silence on commission rates. The District Court held Apple in civil contempt for violating the “spirit” of the injunction. This case exemplifies the court’s expanding power of judicial review, highlighting its ability to enforce the law based on the subjective “spirit” of the law over the written letter. 

The United States Constitution and the governing legislature are often referred to as “living documents,” meaning courts tend to follow the law's intent rather than its literal text, adapting the letter of the law to modern circumstances. However, there is far more grey area with this interpretive license when it comes to injunctions. The courts must ensure that their orders are followed; however, a strict textualist philosophy often allows for the exploitation of loopholes in the letter. An injunction is a tool of the courts to remedy a case in which monetary compensation is not sufficient. Violating an injunction can lead to the offending party being held in contempt of court, leaving them subject to criminal or civil penalties. Strict regulations are necessary to decide whether an injunction is necessary given the potentially significant penalties. A party seeking an injunction must satisfy the four-part balancing test outlined in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council in 2008. The party seeking an injunction must prove they are “likely to succeed on the merits of their underlying cause of action.” Additionally, they must prove that “irreparable harm” is likely if the injunction is not granted and then show that the value they gain from the injunction outweighs the burden a potential injunction places on the offending party. Finally, they are required to prove the injunction would be in the public interest. Courts also face questions about how to interpret and enforce injunctions, whether the exact letter of an injunction should be followed, or whether there is room for a more interpretive approach. The question of whether a party can violate the “spirit” of an injunction without violating its letter is under review by the Supreme Court in Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., with oral arguments scheduled for January 11th, 2027. 

McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co. established that an injunction can prohibit conduct without identifying every method a party might use to violate it. Jacksonville Paper Co. was sued for violating the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued an injunction requiring Jacksonville Paper Co. to modify its payment and record-keeping practices. The company adopted new payment methods; three years after the injunction was issued, the administrator responsible for enforcing the FLSA sought to hold the company in civil contempt for continuing violations. Although the lower courts ruled in favor of the company, the Supreme Court reversed their decision, finding that a violation does not have to be willful in order to be held in civil contempt. Additionally, the Court determined that even though the new methods were not explicitly forbidden by the injunction, they still violated the labor rights defended by the injunction. The Court reasoned that interpreting an injunction too narrowly allows the offending party to keep exploiting loopholes, making the injunction effectively useless, while an overly broad interpretation by the courts may lead to unfair and excessive enforcement of an injunction. A fine line exists between the spirit of the injunction and the courts' interpretation; maintaining it is essential for the law to be enforced correctly.

The injunction against Apple not only raises questions about the interpretive license of the district courts, but also about the limits of their injunctive authority. The letter of the injunction issued against Apple goes beyond the jurisdiction of the district courts, even without any additional interpretive reach from the court. In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the federal government appealed injunctions blocking the enforcement of President Trump’s executive order entitled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship” imposed upon it by district courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the executive order violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the executive order was lawful. Instead, the Court ruled that injunctions should be no broader than necessary to protect the people who brought the lawsuit. An injunction can still benefit others, as long as its scope is necessary to protect those plaintiffs. The injunction issued against Apple raises concerns about its scope because it applies to all App Store developers offering links to outside purchases, rather than Epic alone. The courts argue that the injunction was consistent with CASA because its “scope is tied to Epic’s injuries as a developer and games distributor, not to the other developers’ injuries.” They claim Epic uniquely benefits from this injunction because the anti-steering provisions were “preventing other apps’ users from becoming would-be Epic Games Store consumers.” This logic can be applied to other developers harmed by Apple’s anti-steering provisions, not just Epic. Even though the original injunction was written before CASA was decided, the subsequent appellate courts had the opportunity to rewrite the injunction to follow the new precedent. Instead, they affirmed the previous wording, claiming that “CASA did not undermine this court’s prior analysis of the injunction’s scope.” They argue that a case examining the constitutionality of an action is not equatable to a case dealing with an antitrust liability. The questions over the scope of injunctions issued by the district court are therefore relevant to both cases, even if they focus on different aspects of the law. 

Although precedent permits courts to interpret injunctions when enforcing them, a revised order—including restrictions on commissions—could provide a clearer approach in this case. In reality, however, the difficulty in revising the injunction comes in narrowing the scope so it relates only to the parties directly involved in the case rather than writing a universal injunction. Any restrictions on Apple’s ability to charge commissions would affect all developers—not just Epic—therefore exceeding the district court’s legal authority. While an injunction is a useful tool of the courts to enforce their judgment, some more complex issues require solutions better suited to the scope of the respective case rather than an all-encompassing injunction.

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